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If the future is uncertain, optimal intertemporal decisions rely on anticipating one’s own optimal future behavior
as is typical in dynamic programming. Our aim is to detect experimentally stylized facts about intertemporal
decision making in a rich stochastic environment. Compared to previous experimental studies our experimental
design is more complex since the time horizon is uncertain and termination probabilities have to be updated. In
particular the decision task is non-stationary as in real life which seriously complicates the task of diagnosing
behavioral regularities. In this study we give some illustrative results and provide some general perspectives. Our
main result is that subjects’ reaction to information about termination probablilities are qualitatively correct.
Keywords: intertemporal allocation behavior
JEL Classiﬁcation: C91; D81; D90
1. Introduction
When termination probabilities depend on stochastic events during “life” optimal intertem-
poral decision behavior becomes very difﬁcult to derive since it requires dynamic program-
ming techniques and Bayesian updating. Up to now only a few experimental studies1 have
tried to analyse such behavior (see the survey2 by Anderhub and G¨ uth, 1999). Unlike the
previous experimental studies we do not really hope to ﬁnd optimal behavior. Our main
intention is to detect behavioral regularities and to study the dynamic processes of reason-
ing and decision making by boundedly rational individuals—a topic that is surprisingly
under-researched as far as experimental economics is concerned.
Avoiding Bayesian updating by imposing constant termination probabilities rules out an
importantaspectinreal-lifesavingbehavior. Allowinglaterterminationprobabilitiestode-
pendonearlierresultswouldenormouslycomplicatelife-cycleanalysis. Wethereforehave
developed a ﬁnite horizon model which can more easily accommodate such phenomena.
In our experiment participants learn more about their individual termination probability
during“life”. Thiswasimplementedbyusingthreedice, representingdifferenttermination
probabilities, of which one was excluded after the ﬁrst choice and another after the second
choice. The remaining die then represents the constant termination probability after the
third choice.138 ANDERHUB ET AL.
The experimentally observed periodic expenditure choices should reveal how probabili-
ties are updated and how a highly uncertain future is anticipated. It will, however, require
many more studies to develop an empirically based behavioral alternative for dynamic
programming. The benchmark case of risk neutral intertemporal optimization is derived
numerically and compared with the actual decisions.
In the following Section 2 we describe our experimental design. Section 3 is devoted to
the optimal decision pattern in case of risk neutrality. The results of our experiments are
reported in Section 4: Finally, in Section 5 we discuss our ﬁndings.
2. Experimental setup
Assume that one “lives” for exactly T .>1/ periods during which one can spend S1 mon-
etary units in total. Denoting by xt the expenditure in period t D 1;:::;T the optimal
intertemporal decision vector x¤ D .x¤
1;:::;x¤
T/is derived by maximizing the intertem-
poral utility function u.x1;:::;xT/subject to constraints xt ¸ 0 for t D 1;:::;T and
x1 C¢¢¢CxT · S 1. The computational difﬁculty is similar to determining an optimal
consumption vector for T different products with given prices. Behavioral regularities like
underestimation (see Fehr and Zych, 1995) or overestimation of future needs (see Johnson
et al., 1987) are reported even for deterministic decision environments.
Inourexperimentwecapturethestochasticnatureofhumanlife(expectation)andofmost
intertemporal decision problems by making T, the length of “life”, a stochastic variable.3
More speciﬁcally, in our experiment a participant is sure to “live” for at least three periods
and no longer than six periods, i.e. 3 · T · 6 and T 2 N. Whether the subject experiences
a 4th, 5th, or 6th period is successively determined by one of three dice of different colors
standing for different conditional survival probabilities, namely 1
2 (red die), 2
3 (yellow die),
and 5
6 (green die). At the beginning of each round, a subject does not know which of the
dice will be applied. Instead of this she is informed that after conﬁrming her expenditure
amount x1 in period 1, one of the three dice (probabilities) is randomly taken out and that
after the choice of x2 in period 2 one of the remaining two dice is also randomly taken
out. The last die then determines via successive, independent and identical chance moves
whether the participant lives for 3;4;5; or 6 periods. Thus, one only knows from the third
period on which of the three probabilities will be ﬁnally applied.
Participants (mainly students of economics or business administration at Humboldt
University Berlin) were invited by leaﬂets to register for the experiments which were pre-
dicted to last at most two hours. In the lab participants were seated at isolated terminals
where they found typed German instructions which were also available on the screen. (See
the Appendix for an English translation of the instructions used in the 5-treatment. Except
for a few changes the same instructions were used in the 6-treatment.)
The instructions informed participants that the experiment consists of 12 rounds and that
in each round their task is to allocate a given monetary amount (S1 D 11:92 ECU)4 over an
unknownnumberofperiods(atleast3,atmost6). Itwasexplainedthatafterperiod3,4and
5 it will be periodically decided by one of the three (red, yellow, green) dice with different
termination numbers (f1;2;3g for red, f1;2g for yellow, f1g for green) whether or not there
will be a further period. Let St .t D 2;:::;6/denote what is left of S1 before deciding inAN EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS OF INTERTEMPORAL ALLOCATION BEHAVIOR 139
period t, i.e. for 0 · xt · St one has StC1 D St ¡ xt. Participants were informed that after
their choice of x1 one of the three dice is excluded and that one of the two remaining dice
is excluded after choosing x2.
Our experimental treatment variable concerns how the monetary win depends on the
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The software of the computerized experiment offered access to a calculator so that par-
ticipantscouldeasilycheckthenumericalconsequencesofcertainchoices.5 Beforeplaying
the 12 rounds of the game based on U5 or U6 participants are asked to ﬁll out the 16PA-
personality questionnaire (Brandst¨ atter, 1988), including personal characteristics like age,
gender, and subject of study. Having played the game for 12 rounds they are debriefed by
asking them to rate the experimental situation. Altogether 50 participants played the 5-
game and 50 the 6-game. Without giving any time restrictions sessions needed 90 minutes
on average.
Altogether there are 6 possible sequences of initial chance moves (three possible dice
for the ﬁrst, two possible dice for the second chance move). Each participant played all six
sequences in a random order before they were repeated in another random order.6 In the
followingwerefertotheﬁrstrandomorderofthesixpossiblesequencesasthe“ﬁrstcycle”,
including rounds 1 to 6, and to the second random order as the “second cycle”. Experience
effects can be explored by comparing the behavior for the same sequence in the ﬁrst and
second cycle, but also within a cycle (within a cycle two of the six sequences rely on the
same ﬁrst chance move).
Before the experiment, participants are told how U 2f U 5;U 6gis related to their mone-
tary win in DM (German Mark) which was DM 1:00 D ECU 1.00 for the 5-treatment and
DM 5:00 D ECU 1.00 forU D U6. Instead of imposing that the actual win of a participant
is the average win of all 12 rounds or of a randomly selected round, participants are asked
to decide this for themselves. This decision could indicate personal attitudes towards risk.
3. Optimal consumption behavior
Consider the case when consumption choices are evaluated byU5. If the length of “life” T
with T 2f 3 ;4 ;5 ;6 gwere known, the optimal consumption pattern could easily be derived
as x¤
t D S1=T fort D 1;:::;T. However,foranexperimentalsubjecttheoptimizationtask140 ANDERHUB ET AL.
Figure 1. Optimal consumption behavior (5 left, 6 right).
becomes prohibitively difﬁcult when T is a stochastic variable with values T 2f 3 ;4 ;5 ;6 g .
Thefactthatthesurvivalprobabilitycanassumethreedifferentlevelsillustratesthepractical
impossibility of deriving the optimal behavior, at least in the course of the experiment.7
Infactweourselvesfounditdifﬁculttoderivetheoptimalbehaviorofriskneutraldecision
makers for U5 and U6. However, relying on numerical methods we were able to compute
the optimal consumption paths listed in ﬁgure 1 which will be used as the benchmark
solutions (U5 left and U6 right). Here “:green” means, for instance, that the green die
with termination probability of 1
6 has been excluded. Whereas the boxes of ﬁgure 1 contain
the optimal choices x¤
t , the resulting residual funds S¤
t are given above the boxes.
For U5 only two paths imply xt D 0, namely x¤
6 D 0 in case of the two sequences with
:green and :yellow that offer the least chances for a long “life”. If in spite of the low
continuation probability of 1
2, implied by the red die, one lives for six periods .T D 6/, U5
would be 0 due to x¤
6 D 0.8 Of course, other consumption paths rely on similar forms of
gambling, but they never prescribe x¤
t D 0 for some period t.F o r U 6an extreme choice
x¤
t D 0canneverbeoptimalsincethemarginalutilityof xt goestoC1when xt approaches
0. For both payoff functions consumption increases after “bad news” (:green) whereas
consumption decreases after “good news” (:red).
In general, the situation is more risky for U5 than for U6 where U6 D 0 is possible only
in the case of the absurd behavior x1 D x2 D¢¢¢DxT D0. For the optimal consumption
behaviordescribedinﬁgure1theexpectedvalue¹ofU5 is35:16andthestandarddeviation
¾ is 18:25 whereas for U6 the corresponding values are 6:75 and 1:10.
Allowing for risk aversion (see M¨ uller, in press) does not change the decisive qualitative
propertiesoftheriskneutralbenchmarksolutionsuchasincreasing/decreasingconsumption
after “bad”/“good” news or strictly monotonically decreasing consumption from the third
period on. And since we are more interested in the qualitative characteristics of optimal
behavior than in exact numbers we will use the solution that assumes risk neutrality as a
reference.9AN EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS OF INTERTEMPORAL ALLOCATION BEHAVIOR 141
4. Experimental results
4.1. Average observed behavior and efﬁciency
The average proﬁt of the 600 D 50¢12 (participants¢rounds) observed plays was 27:62
ECU (1 ECU D 1 DM) for the 5-treatment and 6:50 ECU (1 ECU D 5 DM) for the
6-treatment.
To give a ﬁrst impression of the decision data10 ﬁgure 2 shows the mean, minimum,
maximum and variance values for every possible decision node. Above each box the
number of cases is given. The line above or below the entries of each box indicates whether
the observed mean is above or below the benchmark value (ﬁgure 1). Note that in the ﬁrst
three (certain) periods of the 6-treatment subjects tend to oversave. This is not the case for
the 5-treatment.
Recall that according to optimal behavior (see ﬁgure 1) the exclusion of a die requires
updating and adjustment of consumption levels. Almost all means in ﬁgure 2 display the
sameordinalrelationstoeachotherasthecorrespondingoptimalchoicesshowninﬁgure1.
The benchmark solution always prescribes decreasing expenditures after the third period
which is also true for the average behavior. Naturally, the distance between maximum and
Figure 2. Average behavior: Mean, maximal, minimal xt nad variance for each cell (5-treatment left,
6-treatment right).142 ANDERHUB ET AL.
Figure 3. Maximal obtainable payoff for given deviation from x¤
1.
minimum (see ﬁgure 2) becomes usually smaller in later periods when the available funds
are smaller. Thus we state
Observation 1. Average observed behavior is qualitatively similar to optimal behavior.
LetUk with k 2f 1 ;2 gdenote the average payoff in cycle k and letU¤ denote the optimal
expectedpayoffforthe5-and6-treatment. TheefﬁciencyrateUk=U¤ forthe5-treatment
is:79fortheﬁrstcycleand:78forthesecondcycle, forthe6-treatmentthesevaluesare:96
for the ﬁrst cycle and :97 for the second cycle. Thus the average efﬁciency rate essentially
does not change with experience.
The efﬁciency rate in the6-treatment is consistently higher forU6 than forU5 sinceU6




optimal.12 Since the relative deviations from the benchmark behavior in the 6-treatment
are at least as large as in the 5-treatment, the lower efﬁciency for the 5-treatment is due to
its more reactive monetary incentives.
4.2. Initial consumption
In this subsection we investigate consumption within the certain periods t D 1;2;3. For
that purpose deﬁne ¹k :D.xk
1 C xk
2 C xk
3/=11:92 where k D 1;2;:::;6 refers to the six
possible orders of initial chance moves. Thus ¹k measures the relative amount consumedAN EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS OF INTERTEMPORAL ALLOCATION BEHAVIOR 143
Table 1. Ranked sequences of initial consumption (optimal values in brackets).
Sequence 1st chance move 2nd chance move 5-treatment 6-treatment
1 :green :yellow .73 (.80) .83 (.89)
2 :yellow :green .72 (.76) .82 (.88)
3 :green :red .69 (.66) .78 (.81)
4 :red :green .65 (.59) .74 (.79)
5 :yellow :red .63 (.58) .71 (.71)
6 :red :yellow .60 (.56) .70 (.70)
during the three certain periods. We can answer the question of whether there is over- or
undersaving in the certain periods by comparing the average observed value N ¹k with the
value implied by the benchmark solution. Of course, it is also interesting to compare the
measures ¹.6/ for U6 with the measures ¹.5/ for U5.13











3/¤ imply. (The values .xk
t /¤ can be inferred from ﬁgure 1:) Table 1 shows the means
N ¹k .k D 1;:::;6/of the observed values ¹k for each treatment and sequence separately.
Furthermore, the optimal values ¹¤
k are given in parentheses. Inspection of Table 1 reveals
that the observed means are ranked in the same order as the optimal values, i.e. on average
subjects’ updating of termination probabilities is qualitatively correct. Furthermore, the
observed means N ¹k of the 6-treatment are on average about 10% higher than in the 5-
treatment. Our main conclusion is that subjects’ reactions to information about termination
probabilities are qualitatively correct.
This conclusion can be statistically validated: Let us divide the six sequences into two
groups. Group 1 contains sequence 1, 2 and 3 and group 2 all others, i.e. we combine
the sequences with higher initial consumption in group 1 and those with lower initial
consumption in group 2. For each round we can assign each participant to one of the two
groups. Using the Mann–Whitney–U test we have checked whether consumption in these
groups (see Table 2) can be viewed as being signiﬁcantly different. The null-hypothesis
of equal initial consumption in group 1 and 2 can usually be rejected.14 Note that this test
already indicates signiﬁcant differences in the ﬁrst round of both treatments. Only for the
5th round of the 6-treatment we could not reject the null-hypothesis. Thus, participants’
Table 2. Average initial consumption shares within the two groups.
Round 123456789 1 0 1 1 1 2
5 , group 1 .70 .70 .73 .74 .71 .69 .69 .71 .72 .71 .72 .71
5, group 2 .61 .62 .65 .65 .63 .64 .63 .62 .62 .62 .62 .61
6, group 1 .80 .82 .82 .79 .78 .84 .82 .79 .80 .83 .79 .79
6, group 2 .70 .71 .73 .71 .76 .71 .70 .70 .69 .69 .70 .74144 ANDERHUB ET AL.
reactions were at least qualitatively as predicted, i.e. higher initial consumption after “bad
news” and lower initial consumption after “good news”.
Summarizing these ﬁndings we state
Observation 2. On average subjects’ reactions to initial chance moves are qualitatively
correct.
On the individual level the decision x2 should be inﬂuenced by the information about the
ﬁrst excluded die. If, for instance, the red die is excluded this implies a longer expected
life. The average consumption levels
x2




























In order to test this we computed individual averages, i.e. we took the means of the relative
expenditures
x2
S2 over all 12 rounds for every individual. The binomial test for
H0: Subjects do not fulﬁll condition .1/
rejects this hypothesis with p < 0:005 for both treatments. It can thus be maintained that






























H0: Subjects do not fulﬁll condition .2/
was tested in the same way as above and rejected with p<0:005. These results are sum-
marized by
Observation 3. On the individual level, subjects’ updating of termination probabilities is
qualitatively correct.
When choosing x1 a participant encounters in all 12 rounds the same decision problem.
Neverthelessweobservewidelyvarying x1-valuesforthesameparticipant: ForU5 only11
of 50 participants rely on the same x1-choice for the ﬁrst cycle of the 6 possible sequences
of initial chance moves; for the second cycle this number increases to 17 (8 participants
always chose the same x1-value). For U6 these numbers were 6 for the ﬁrst cycle, 13 for
the second cycle and 5 always. Even after playing 6 rounds of the game, many participants
are still experimenting with x1.15
Since the initially available amount S1 was not prominent, a participant could yield to
prominence once by choosing prominent levels of xt or by inducing prominent values StAN EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS OF INTERTEMPORAL ALLOCATION BEHAVIOR 145
for t > 1. For U5 the outstanding focal decision was x1 D 2:00 (144 times), for U6 it was
x1 D 3:00 (111 times). Only for U5 the values x1 D 1:92 (49 of the 600 observations) and
x1 D 2:92 (26 times) were rather prominent (for U6 the corresponding frequencies are 11
and 13).
4.3. Behavior in later periods
We now analyse the behavior in the second part of a round consisting of the uncertain
periods 4, 5 and 6. When choosing xt for t ¸ 3 participants do not know whether “life”
ends in periodt in which case all saved money would be lost. Optimal as well as boundedly
rational behavior requires x3 > x4 > x5 > x6.16
Table3(forthe5-treatment)andTable4(forthe6-treatment)showthenumberofplays
reaching at least the 4th,5 th or 6th period and the hit rates for the listed criteria. Substituting
Table 3. Facing an uncertain future (5-treatment).
Cases %
T ¸ 4 392 100.0
x3 > x4 267 68.1
x3 ¸ x4 352 89.8
T ¸ 5 273 100.0
x4 > x5 179 65.6
x4 ¸ x5 244 89.4
T D 6 211 100.0
x5 > x6 160 75.8
x5 ¸ x6 192 91.0
Cases %
T ¸ 5 273 100.0
x3 > x4 > x5 127 46.5
x3 ¸ x4 ¸ x5 215 78.8
T D 6 211 100.0
x4 > x5 > x6 98 46.4
x4 ¸ x5 ¸ x6 171 81.1
Cases %
T D 6 211 100.0
x3 > x4 > x5 > x6 75 35.5
x3 ¸ x4 ¸ x5 ¸ x6 150 71.1
Table 4. Facing an uncertain future (6-treatment).
Cases %
T ¸ 4 395 100.0
x3 > x4 295 74.7
x3 ¸ x4 365 92.4
T ¸ 5 272 100,0
x4 > x5 210 77.2
x4 ¸ x5 249 91.5
T ¸ 6 193 100.0
x5 > x6 159 82.4
x5 ¸ x6 180 93.3
Cases %
T ¸ 5 272 100.0
x3 > x4 > x5 159 58.5
x3 ¸ x4 ¸ x5 234 86.0
T ¸ 6 193 100.0
x4 > x5 > x6 133 68.9
x4 ¸ x5 ¸ x6 170 88.1
Cases %
T ¸ 6 193 100.0
x3 > x4 > x5 > x6 94 48.7
x3 ¸ x4 ¸ x5 ¸ x6 159 82.4146 ANDERHUB ET AL.
the strict inequality xt > xtC1 by the weak one, xt ¸ xtC1, strongly increases the predictive
success of the criteria. When, for instance, participants reach the sixth period in the 5-
treatment, 35:5% of them obey the criterion x3 > x4 > x5 > x6 and 71:1% the weaker
condition x3 ¸ x4 ¸ x5 ¸ x6. The remaining 28:9% failed at least once. Approximately
90% of all cases satisfy xt ¸ xtC1 when only two subsequent periods are compared. In
general, results are better for the 6-treatment than for the 5-treatment.
Observation 4. On the individual level many subjects do not satisfy the mild conditions
xt > xtC1 for t ¸ 3 for bounded rationality.
One may argue that optimal consumption behavior cannot be expected when it is prac-
tically impossible for the participants to compute it, but that it yields reliable predictions
whenitiseasilyderived. Nearlyall.S5;x5/-observationsinthecaseofthereddieliebelow
the conditionally optimal decision curve which is (piecewise) linear for U6 (U5). Thus
participants have usually left more for period 6 than required by the benchmark solution.
Similar, but less clear results apply to the other dice.
4.4. Randomize- versus average-types
Before determining x1 for the ﬁrst time each participant is asked whether he prefers the
average payoff of all 12 rounds or the payoff of a randomly selected round. We will refer to
participantsoftype A (average)andoftype R (random). IncaseofU5 16of50participants
are of type R whereas for U6 this number is 10. One can view this selection as revealing
personal attitudes towards risk. R-types could be seen as more risk-loving since they prefer
a payment which is the result of a lottery.17
We ﬁrst compare the behavior of the A- and R-participants when choosing x1. Table 5
shows the mean of x1 for each of the twelve rounds and for both types and treatments
separately as well as the p-levels resulting from a one-sided Mann–Whitney–U test (H0 :
¹A · ¹R). For both treatments the means of the R-types are smaller than the means of the
A-types, except for the 6th round of U6. But these differences are usually signiﬁcant only
for U5 (they are not signiﬁcant in rounds 6 and 9 of the 5-treatment).
Thechoices x2 and x3 donotrevealsimilarlystrongdifferencesbetweentypesevenwhen
they rely on the same initial chance moves. However, the relative amount ¹ D
x1Cx2Cx3
11:92
Table 5. Means of x1 for both types and treatments.
Round 123456789 1 0 1 1 1 2
5 , type A 2.67 2.81 2.92 2.96 2.76 2.64 2.75 2.67 2.68 3.20 2.75 2.66
5, type R 2.53 2.28 2.29 2.30 2.38 2.42 2.23 2.24 2.49 2.26 2.31 2.23
p-levels :073 :031 :025 :060 :071 :251 :018 :015 :210 :008 :071 :025
6, type A 3.37 3.61 3.30 3.45 3.76 3.18 3.59 3.48 3.21 3.06 3.16 3.20
6, type R 2.82 2.72 2.92 2.62 2.82 3.22 2.52 3.22 2.22 2.47 2.32 2.42
p-levels :272 :064 :304 :131 :121 :476 :098 :339 :064 :292 :098 :174AN EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS OF INTERTEMPORAL ALLOCATION BEHAVIOR 147
Table 6. Means of ¹ D
x1Cx2Cx3
11:92 for both types and for all sequences.
Sequence :gr.,:yel. :yel,:gr :gr.,:red :red,:gr. :yel.,:red : red,:yel.
5, type A 0:75 0:74 0:70 0:67 0:64 0:61
5, type R 0:68 0:67 0:66 0:62 0:60 0:57
6, type A 0:85 0:83 0:79 0:75 0:72 0:70
6, type R 0:73 0:77 0:72 0:69 0:66 0:66
Table 7. Average results for both types.
5-treatment 6-treatment
A-types R-types A-types R-types
Average payoff 27:14 28:63 6:48 6:56
Std. deviation 14:62 17:52 1:17 1:29
Efﬁciency rate 0:77 0:81 0:96 0:97
spentinthecertainperiodst D 1;2;3isagaintypedependent(seeTable6)what, ofcourse,
is mainly due to the differences in the choice of x1. Note, that in our experimental situation
there is both the risk of spending too much in the beginning and “living long” and the risk
of saving too much in the beginning and “dying early”. If R-types were just hoping for a
long life this would explain why they consumed less than A-types in the certain periods.
This would be consistent with our interpretation of R-types.
Let us also compare the average payoffs, standard deviations and the efﬁciency rates
Uk=U¤, k 2fA ;R g ;whereUk denotes the average payoff of k D A and k D R for all twelve
rounds and U¤ the expected payoff of the benchmark behavior.
R-types are slightly more successful than A-types (Table 7). But these differences are
not signiﬁcant. We summarize this by
Observation 5. Self-selection between random and average payment (R- and A-types) is
only weakly correlated with individual differences in intertemporal allocation behavior.
4.5. Decision times
The decision times m¿
t (¿- index of the round, t- index of the period) which were recorded
by the computer for every decision x¿









3 changes from “life” to “life”. We expected that
the time m¿
1;2;3 that a participant needs in round ¿ depends on ¿ like m¿
1;2;3 D ® C
¯
¿ with
¿ 2f 2 ;3 ;:::;12g.18 Calculating the regression for both treatments we get the following
results: For the 5-treatment ® D52:9 and ¯ D543:4 .R2 D0:976/ and for the 6-treatment148 ANDERHUB ET AL.
Figure 4. Regressed and actual average for the decision times (5 left and 6 right).
® D55:4 and ¯ D512:4, .R2 D0:920/. The mean decision times m¿
1;2;3 for x1;x2 and x3
as well as the regression lines are shown in ﬁgure 4. These results strongly conﬁrm the
“learning by playing”-process.
5. Summary and outlook
Compared to other experimental studies of dynamic decision making our design is more
complex since players have to update their termination probabilities which depend on
stochastic events during “life”. Thus we could investigate whether people react to infor-
mation (via the choices of x1, x2 and x3 for different sequences of initial chance moves).
Intertemporalallocationbehaviorinthemoreclassicalsettingofconstantterminationprob-
abilities has been explored by inspecting the choices of x3, x4, and x5. Using this general
frameweimplementeddifferentriskstructuresbyimplementingdifferentpayofffunctions.
The main ﬁndings of our study are:
(i) Average observed behavior displays similar effects as the benchmark solution, based
on risk neutral utility maximization.
(ii) In the complex stochastic environment on average subjects react in a qualitatively
correct way to “good” or “bad” news, i.e. on average subjects make use of particular
information concerning their length of “life”.
(iii) With regard to the uncertain horizon we ﬁnd that subjects are initially too cautious in
case of the 6-treatment, i.e. they usually leave (compared to the benchmark) more for
the uncertain periods. In the 5-treatment behavior in early periods depends on which
dice are taken out, i.e. how termination probabilities have to be revised.
(iv) Self-selection between random and average payment (R- and A-types) is only weakly
correlated with individual differences in intertemporal allocation behavior.
(v) Further data analysis revealed that qualitative learning, e.g. in the sense of directional
learning (see Selten and Buchta, 1999, for a more positive result) is only weakly
conﬁrmed. When subjects are confronted with a highly stochastic environment it is
apparently very difﬁcult to attribute poor results to bad luck or improvable choices.AN EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS OF INTERTEMPORAL ALLOCATION BEHAVIOR 149
Findings (i) and (ii) conﬁrm the economic theory of intertemporal choice at least in a
qualitativesenseandare, thus, inlinewiththepositiveresultsreportedinotherstudies(e.g.,
Hey, 1982; Gigliotti and Sopher, 1997).
Intertemporal decision making is one prominent topic of the “anomalies and biases”-
program (see, e.g., Thaler, 1981; Loewenstein, 1988; and for a survey Loewenstein and
Thaler, 1989) questioning the empirical relevance of optimal solutions. Often the experi-
ments did not rely on monetary rewards at all and, if so, their salience is questionable.19
In our study we distinguish two types of intertemporal preferences of which one is much
more salient in the sense that deviating from optimality is much more costly. How can our
results be related to this debate? On the one hand it is obvious that the advice to maximize
expected payoffs offers no practical help since the problem is much too complex. On the
otherhandmanyparticipantsreactadequatelytochangesinlifeexpectationwheresaliency,
as controlled by our two treatments, does not seem to matter much. Thus, for the anomalies
and biases-program our results could demonstrate that optimization does not work and that
even basic aspects of bounded rationality are neglected. However, since observed average
behavior in the complex stochastic environment is much in line with the intuition, provided
by the theoretical benchmark solution, one can argue that our results support traditional
economic theory.
Ingeneral,manymoreresearchquestionscanbeexploredwiththehelpofourexperimen-
tal data. Moreover, from the very beginning our experimental design has been structured in
such a way that it allows for systematic variations such as simplifying or complicating its
stochastic nature. Anderhub (1998) analyses a model that is similar to the one developed
herebutwithreducedstochasticcomplexity(seeendnote20). Inthisstudydiceofdifferent
colors no longer represent termination probabilities, but rather the actual length of life.
This study conﬁrms that subjects’ reactions to information are qualitatively correct. M¨ uller
(in press) considers alternatives (strategies and heuristics) to the optimal backward induc-
tion solution and investigates how the solution is inﬂuenced by allowing for risk aversion.
Brandst¨ atter and G¨ uth (1998) account for differences in intertemporal allocation behav-
ior by different personality types as elicited by the 16 PA-personality questionnaire. Our
experiment has also been performed on the Internet (Anderhub et al., in press).
Appendix—Translated instructions of the ¦-treatment
Your task in every round is to distribute an amount of money as well as possible to several
periods. The better this is done the higher is your payoff. Altogether you play 12 rounds.
In the beginning of the experiment you can choose whether we should draw lots to select
one round for which you are paid. Otherwise you will receive the mean of your payoffs of
all rounds. In any case you get your payoff in cash after evaluation of the data.
Thegeneralaimofeachroundistodistributeacertainamountofmoneytoseveralperiods.
Your payoff of one round is equal to the product of the amounts of money allocated to the
single periods. However, there is no certainty about the number of periods to which you
have to distribute your money. The game can last for three, four, ﬁve, or six periods. Every150 ANDERHUB ET AL.
round will last for at least three periods. Whether you reach the fourth, ﬁfth or sixth period
will be determined by throwing a die. There are three different dice colored red, yellow
and green. The following table shows in which cases you reach the next period.
Color of die No further period if die shows New period if die shows
Red 1;2;34 ; 5 ; 6
Yellow 1;23 ; 4 ; 5 ; 6
Green 1 2;3;4;5;6
The number of periods of which one round consists can not be higher than six. In the
beginning of a round you do not know which die is used. You get this information after
you have made some decisions. The general course of the game is as follows:
1st period/ You will get an amount of money S, which you can spend in the coming
periods. Altogether you can only spend this amount. You choose an amount x1, which you
want to spend in the ﬁrst period. Think very carefully about how much you want to spend
and how much you want to save for the following periods. After your decision one of the
three dice is excluded. Now you know that only the two other dice are candidates for the
chance moves deciding whether you reach the fourth, ﬁfth or sixth period.
2nd period/ You choose an amount x2, which you want to spend in the second period.
You can only spend what you have left from the total amount after the ﬁrst period. After
your decision another die is excluded. Now you know which die remains to be thrown for
the fourth, ﬁfth and sixth period.
3rdperiod/Youchooseanamount x3, whichyouwanttospendinthethirdperiod. After
this decision the computer will throw the remaining die in order to decide whether you
reach the fourth period. If you do not reach the fourth period, the round ends here. The
amount which has not been spent until now is lost.
4th period/ If you reach the fourth period, you will have to choose an amount x4.
Afterwards the die will be thrown again.
5thperiod/Ifyoureachtheﬁfthperiod,youwillhavetochooseanamountx5. Afterwards
the die will be thrown again.
6th period/ If you reach the sixth period, you do not have to make a decision, because
all remaining money is spent automatically.
Your payoff is calculated by the product of all amounts you spent in the periods you
reached. For instance if you reached exactly four periods, your payoff is determined by
G D x1 ¢ x2 ¢ x3 ¢ x4. When you have reached all six periods, your payoff is determined
by G D x1 ¢ x2 ¢ x3 ¢ x4 ¢ x5 ¢ x6 where x6 is the amount you have left after the ﬁfth period.
Please think about the following: If you spend an amount of 0 in one period, your payoff
will also be 0, because one of the factors is 0. This can happen, for instance, if you spend
all money in the fourth period and reach the ﬁfth period. Then you have to spend 0 in the
ﬁfth and perhaps also in the sixth period and therefore you get the payoff 0. You have to
consider both the risk of spending all your money early and the risk of making your money
useless in the case the game ends.AN EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS OF INTERTEMPORAL ALLOCATION BEHAVIOR 151
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Notes
1. Early ﬁeld evidence is reviewed by Hall (1978).
2. This survey is conﬁned to studies in experimental economics. Intertemporal allocation behavior, especially
saving behavior is, of course, also a topic in economic psychology (see, for instance, W¨ arneryd, 1999).
3. Positive termination probabilities imply less concern for the future like positive discount rates, i.e. discount
factorssmallerthan1(seeAnderhubandG¨ uth,1999,whopresentvariousformulationsandtheirexperimental
results).
4. ECU—Experimental Currency Unit.
5. We did not record how often and to what purpose the calculator was used.
6. Wewantedtocontroltheexclusionofthediceinordertogetmorecomparableresultsandtotestforexperience
effects. We did not ﬁnd any evidence that participants noticed this minor regularity.
7. For given S5.>0/, termination probability w with 0<w<1 and C Dx1 ¢ x2 ¢ x3 ¢ x4.>0/ the total payoff
is U5 D C ¢ x5[w C .1 ¡ w/.S5 ¡ x5/]. From
@U5
@x5 D 0 and
@2U5





2 ; S5g for all x1;x2;x3;x4; S5 > 0. Inserting x¤
5 into U5 yields already two
different optimisation tasks for t D 4.
8. As demonstrated in M¨ uller (in press), in the case of U5 all consumption levels are positive if one allows for
a sufﬁciently high degree of risk aversion.
9. For a control group of 14 participants we used the binary lottery-technique (see Roth and Malouf, 1979) for
the 5-treatment. The results did not reveal obvious deviations from the results discussed here. Moreover,
for evidence questioning the validity of the binary lottery-technique see G¨ uth et al. (1993) and Selten et al.
(1999).
10. The complete set of data is availiable from the authors upon request.
11. For U DU6 the relative deviation measure rd.xt/ D
jx¤
t .St/¡xtj
St is usually larger than for U DU5 where
x¤
t .St/ denotes the conditionally optimal choice, given the availiable fund St; and xt the actual choice in
period t.
12. The choice of x1 D S1, for instance, implies U5 D 0 and U6 D
p
S1.
13. The measures ¹.5/ and ¹.6/ did not change very much from the ﬁrst to the second cycle.
14. The Mann-Whitney U-test usually yields p<:01: Exceptions are rounds 7 and 11 of the 5-treatment and
round 11 of the 6-treatment where p<:05: In round 6 of the 5-treatment and rounds 4 and 12 of the
6-treatment we get p <: 1 :
15. The data reveal that more variations in x1 resulted in lower payoffs. This can be seen by looking at the
correlation coefﬁcient between the standard deviation of x1 and the mean payoffs over all 12 rounds, which
is ¡:63 for the 5-treatment and ¡:37 for the 6-treatment.
16. Even extreme risk aversion does not lead to xt D xtC1 for t ¸ 3 (see M¨ uller, in press).
17. Note, however, that the lottery in which the R-types ﬁnally wish to participate is not exogenously given but
is—to a large extent—determined by these subjects’ performance during the experiment.
18. When the ﬁrst decision screen appeared many participants started to read the instructions again. We therefore
exclude round ¿ D 1.
19. Harrison (1994) argues that “several of the most widely cited pieces of experimental evidence contrary to
EUT [Expected Utility Theory] and Bayes Rule [:::] do not satisfy the accepted precepts of experimental
economics” and shows that “modiﬁcations to the experiments to remedy these design weaknesses result in
observed choice behavior consistent with the predictions of economic theory” (p. 251).152 ANDERHUB ET AL.
20. Anderhub et al. (2000) add a further (self-selected) stochastic aspect by allowing to invest S2 in a proﬁtable
but risky prospect.
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